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ANTITRUST ON THE REBOUND
Joseph M. Alioto*
Americans love competition. In sports. In politics. In
ideas. In business. In everything. They demand it. They
fight for it. In the marketplace, they know that competition
guarantees the best possible product or service at the lowest
possible price, and that everyone has the chance to make a
better mousetrap. It is obvious to them that the more
competitors there are, the more competition there is. And the
more competition there is, the better the services and
products and the lower the prices.
Monopolists hate competition. They suppress it. They
lobby against it. They know that competition in the
marketplace creates too much uncertainty-they never know
what the other guy is going to do. They are frightened by the
notion that profits must be earned, rather than simply taken.
They are terrified that some newcomer may unseat them. It
is obvious to them that the fewer competitors there are, the
less uncertainty there is. And the less uncertainty there is,
the less concern they have about the quality of the services,
the improvement of products, or the raising of prices.
Monopolists are continually attempting to regulate
competition and the market by agreement with competitors or
through anti-competitive practices. To a monopolist, a free
market governed by supply and demand is an anathema.
This struggle between the people who demand free
competition and the monopolists who seek to regulate it was
supposed to be settled with the passage of the antitrust laws.'
* B.A., St. Mary's College, Student Body President, 1965; J.D., University
of San Francisco, 1968; Plaintiff Antitrust Litigation and Trial Specialist, over
70 trials-two trials in 1974 and 1981 were the largest judgments in the history
of antitrust at that time; lecturer on antitrust; testified before Congress and US
Senate; debated Reagan Administration Antitrust Chiefs.
1. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (1998), Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
12-27 (1998), Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1998).
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Not so. The law of the land never deterred monopolists from
supporting any pretended theory that supposedly justified
their elimination of competition.
John D. Rockefeller and his comrade in arms, J.P.
Morgan, led the first attack on the antitrust laws.2 They and
the other industrial marauders were propped up by the
ready-made social scientist, Herbert Spencer, who gladly
supplied a social theory of "survival of the fittest" as a
justification for any conduct. Scratching, kicking, biting,
hitting below the belt, paying of the referee and fixing the
fight were okay. For a while, John and his friends were
allowed to run amuck. They set out to destroy all forms of
competition. In pursuit of this objective, they engaged in
well-known anti-competitive tactics. They merged when it
was too inconvenient to fix prices. They shut down plants,
branches, and offices. They fired "redundant" employees.
They raised prices. They eliminated the need for
improvements and innovation. They allowed products and
services to deteriorate. They paid bribes, rebates, and
kickbacks when threats were not enough. They let loose into
the market pinstriped thugs to ferret out and suppress or buy
actual or potential competitors. They told customers what,
when, and where they would buy and at what price they
would pay. They also told customers to wait in line. The
police did nothing. Some of the victims went to court. They
found that henchmen for the monopolists had replaced
impartial judges. These judges espoused pretentious and
elitist philosophies. They ruled that the anti-monopoly laws
did not apply to monopolies,' that victims had no right to sue,
and that juries were too stupid and uneducated to understand
the arcane subtleties of fixing prices or running someone out
of business. It was a time to go back to basics, way back.
In 1543, a Polish monk, Nicolaus Copernicus, in his book
entitled On the Revolution of the Celestial Bodies,4 stunned
western civilization with his scientific and mathematical
proof that the earth and the other planets revolve around the
sun. The ancient Ptolemaic theory was suddenly wrong.
2. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States
v. Northern Securities Co., 128 F. 808 (D.C. Minn. 1904).
3. See United States v. Knight, 336 U.S. 505 (1949).
4. NIcoLAus COPERNICUS, ON THE REVOLUTION OF THE HEAVENLY
SPHERES (Newton Abott ed. 1976)
810 [Vol. 39
ANTITRUST
There was a new perspective. A new way to look at things.
From that time forward, every new idea that challenged deep-
rooted established thought would be known as
"revolutionary." And there were no ideas more
"revolutionary" than those that surfaced in 1776, at the
height of the Age of Enlightenment, whose motto, according
to Emmanuel Kant, was "Dare to Know."
Seventeen seventy-six was a bad year for kings and
monopolists. Both were indicted. The prosecutors were two
great giants of the Enlightenment, Thomas Jefferson, a man
for all seasons, and Adam Smith, the founding father of
economics. The Bills of Particulars were called The
Declaration of Independence and The Wealth of Nations.5 The
offenses were laid out in scathing detail. "Divine Right" was
repudiated as fundamentally offensive. Monopoly power was
rejected as repugnant, absurd, and contrary to the natural
forces of the marketplace. From thence forward, the
perspective would have a different vantage point. There was
a new premise: all power-political, social, and economic-
emanates from the people. Jefferson flatly asserted that the
power of the government came from the "consent of the
governed."6  Adam Smith turned the tables on the
monopolists by demonstrating that the power of the market
comes from the consumers. He said,
[c]onsumption is the sole end and purpose of all
production; and the interest of the producer ought to be
attended to only so far as it may be necessary for
promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so
perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt
to prove it. But in the mercantile system, the interest of
the consumer is almost constantly sacrificed to that of the
producer.
It was the first authoritative declaration of the aphorism,
"The customer is always right."
There was never any question about the strong
relationship between the economic freedom from monopolies
espoused by Adam Smith and the political and social liberties
enunciated by Thomas Jefferson. As proof, in December of
5. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS: A CONCORDANCE, (Fred R Glahe ed., 1976).
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (1776).
7. SMITH, supra note 5, bk. IV, ch. VIII at 179.
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1787, during the height of the debates on the need to add a
Bill of Rights to the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson wrote
James Madison and complained about "[t]he omission of a bill
of rights providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms for
freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against
standing armies, restriction against monopolies,... trials by
jury in all matters of fact ... ." This was the harbinger of
what would later become the unique antitrust laws of the
United States.
Indeed, although "restrictions against monopolies" never
became a formal part of the Bill of Rights, the antitrust laws
were specifically compared to the Bill of Rights by the one
Justice of the Supreme Court who was uniquely qualified to
make the comparison.9 In the Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,1° Justice Marshall
said:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And
the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no
matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert
with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever
economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such freedom
is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to
one sector of the economy because certain private citizens
or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote
greater competition in a more important section of the
11
economy.
One of the reasons why the antitrust laws are so
necessary is the strong motive of monopolists to eliminate
competition, contrary to the interests of society and the
people. The three primary components of an economic
system, the rent from land, the wages from labor, and the
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 1787) (copy on
file with author).
9. Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was forced to live under the absurd
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was
the attorney who successfully argued Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), the landmark decision forever prohibiting segregation.
10. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
11. United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972).
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profit from capital, are affected differently by competition in a
progressive society. As Adam Smith observed:
[T]he rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with
the prosperity, and fall with the declension, of the society.
On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich, and high in
poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries
which are going fastest to ruin. The interest of this third
order, therefore, has not the same connection with the
general interest of the society as that of the other two.
12
As is obvious, Smith says, "[t]he price of monopoly is upon
every occasion the highest which can be got. The natural
price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is the
lowest which can be taken....""
This meant that if competition existed, profits would be
lower, more workers would be necessary at higher wages, and
more property would be needed, such as plants, branches, and
local outlets. The result of all of this for the consumer would
be better products and services at lower prices. But
competition meant that the manufacturer would make less
profit. Smith, therefore, made it plain that the manufacturer
in a competitive market would be tempted constantly to join
with his competitors to eliminate competition. Smith
sagaciously observed that such tempted competitors use any
and every occasion to thwart competition: "People of the same
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against
the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices." 4 This
principle was incorporated in antitrust law as a factor that a
jury may consider when deciding a price-fixing case. 5
The prohibitions of the antitrust laws "were" clear and
understandable. Any attempt by competitors to artificially
regulate the market was prohibited. The consumer was
entitled to the best possible product or service at the lowest
possible price, all as determined by competition. Thus,
competitors could not fix prices. 6 Competitors could not
divide markets or customers between themselves.'7
12. SMITH, supra note 5, bk. I, ch. XI at 277, 278.
13. SMITH, supra note 5, bk. I, ch. VII at 66.
14. SMITH, supra note 5, bk. I, ch. X at 144.
15. See C-O-Two Fire Equip. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952).
16. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
17. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990); Topco Assoc. v
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Competitors could not boycott or instigate a boycott of
another competitor, supplier, or customer.18 A manufacturer
or producer could not condition the sale of a desirable product
on the forced sale of an undesirable or unwanted product. 9
Once a manufacturer or producer sold his product and
received his profit he could not dictate to the purchaser
where, to whom, or at what price the purchaser could resell
the product. ° A competitor could not buy or merge with
another competitor or potential competitor where the effect
would be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly.2' A monopolist could not take anti-competitive
steps to maintain or achieve the monopoly.22
It is common sense that each and every one of these
prohibitions would, if allowed, directly interfere with free
market forces and deprive the consumer of the best possible
product or service at the lowest possible price. Yet
monopolists, and their propagandists, will try to confound the
public to justify such restrictions, falsely claiming that they
act in the best interest of the people. This is not new, as
Adam Smith noted:
That it was the spirit of monopoly, which originally both
invented and propagated [restraint of trade], cannot be
doubted; and they who first taught it were by no means
such fools as they who believed it. In every country it
always is and must be the interests of the great body of
the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it
cheapest. The proposition is so manifest, that it seems
ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever
have been called in question, had not the interested
sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the
common sense of mankind. Their interest is, in this
respect, directly opposite to the great body of the people.22
But there never is a dearth of those who jump at the
opportunity to appease the monopolists with some conjured
reasoning, which favors the suppression of competition or
United States, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
18. See Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
19. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. See United States v. Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
21. See Brown Shoe v United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
22. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
23. SMITH, supra note 5, bk. IV, ch. III at 519.
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competitors. Smith's observation on this matter is
particularly revealing, and goes a long way toward
understanding how reputable intellectuals can so easily
espouse theories favorable to the monopolists:
[the person] who supports every proposal for
strengthening this monopoly, is sure to acquire not only
the reputation of understanding trade, but great
popularity and influence with an order of men whose
number and wealth render them of great importance. If
he opposes them, on the contrary, and still more if he has
authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the
most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the
greatest public services, can protect him from the most
infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insult, nor
sometimes from real danger, arising from the insolent
24
outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists.
In the 1970s and 1980s, there emerged from the
University founded by John D. Rockefeller, a group of
theorists who decided to take up the cause of the beleaguered
monopolists. The progenitor apparently was Aaron Director.
He greatly influenced the thinking of both Robert Bork and
Richard Posner, as they both have said. These theorists were
aided in the promulgation of their views by a number of
factors. First, "there were no entrenched political interests to
overcome." 25  Second, according to Bork, "the socialist
drive ... moved on ... in fields such as environmentalism."26
And, third, the President of the 1980s did not interfere with
the germination of the theories. With this "happy"
consequence of no opposition and a pliable Administration, an
all out attack was launched against the antitrust laws
themselves, the victims of antitrust violations, and the juries.
According to these writers, most of the antitrust laws should
be repealed, especially those relating to monopolies! The
right to sue should be limited to those who probably would
not sue anyway. Prison sentences for antitrust violators
should be abolished. Treble damages should be eliminated.
And, to ensure that no antitrust suit would be brought by
24. Smith, supra note 5, bk. IV, ch. II at 494.
25. Christopher C. DeMuth, Captain of Enerprise: On the Business of
Liberty, POL'Y REV. (1992).
26. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1993).
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some small businessman, no matter the extent of his injuries,
there should be an award of attorneys' fees to winning
defendants! But that is not all. Juries are too stupid and
unsophisticated to determine complex antitrust cases.
Moreover, the perspective must be from the monopolists point
of view, not the consumers'. "Efficiency" is the goal of
antitrust enforcement, and whether any small businessman
who may have been extirpated root and branch was really
nothing but a "free-rider" anyway.27
The flaws in these arguments are manifest. With regard
to the elitist attack upon the jury system, little need be said.
First, the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right.2"
Second, the Supreme Court has held that the jury is "an
essential part of the Congressional plan making competition
rather than monopoly the rule of trade."29 Third, in this
country, the people-the jury-elect the President and the
Senators who nominate and confirm the Judges. Finally,
there is nothing that could possibly support a view that
judges are better able to determine antitrust conspiracy cases
than a jury.
With regard to the argument that "efficiency" is the goal
of antitrust enforcement, the argument does not outlive its
statement. This is the "efficiency" of monopoly, not of
competition. It is used to justify the merger of two rivals, so
that the combination may eliminate what was needed when
competition existed: plants, employees, and customer
services. Real efficiency is the efficiency of capital following
competition, not running away from it. As Smith said,
If this capital is divided between two different grocers
their competition will tend to make both of them sell
cheaper, than if it were in the hands of one only; and if it
were divided among twenty, the competition would be just
so much the greater, and the chance of their combining
together, in order to raise the price, just so much the
less. °
There will always be those who rail against the antitrust
laws and their vigorous enforcement. But in each such
instance, one will find, "[i]t comes from an order of men,
27. See id. at 332.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
29. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
30. SMITH, supra note 5, bk. II, ch. V at 383.
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whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the
public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to
oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many
occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.""'
31. SMITH, supra note 5, bk. I, ch. XI at 278.
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